Abstract. We study how effectively a group of rational agents learns from repeatedly observing each others' actions. We find that, in the long-run, observing discrete actions of others is significantly less informative than observing their private information: only a fraction of the private information is transmitted. We study how this fraction depends on the distribution of private signals.
Introduction
In many economic situations, the costs and benefits of possible choices are initially unknown, but can be learned over time. Frequently, agents learn not only from their own experiences, but also from observing the choices made by others facing the same decision. For example, a monopolistic seller in a local market learns about the optimal price both by observing her own demand, as well as by observing the prices other sellers charge in similar markets. Likewise, observing who one's social network friends support might influence who one believes to be the better candidate in an election.
In many such situations information arrives over time, and all agents eventually learn. Two important questions arise: How quickly do they learn, and more interestingly, how does the nature of their social interaction affect their speed of learning?
We study a group of agents who interact repeatedly and try to learn a common state from private signals, as well as from the actions of the others. Every period, each agent observes a private signal, takes an action to maximize her expected utility, and observes others' actions. We study settings with purely informational externalities, i.e., each agent's utility is independent of the others' actions, and hence agents care about others' actions only because they provide information. As in the herding literature (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Banerjee, 1992; Smith and Sørensen, 2000; Chamley, 2004) , private signals are independent of actions, and consequently agents have no experimentation motive. Since each agent can learn the state from her private signals, the question is not whether or not she learns the state eventually, but rather how quickly she does so.
When agents' action spaces are sufficiently rich (e.g., when sellers choose prices from a continuum), actions reveal beliefs, and thereby reveal all the payoff relevant information that is contained in the private signals. In this case no information is lost, and the joint decision problem reduces to that of a single agent. However, when actions are discrete (e.g., when sellers must choose one of finitely many prices), we show that information is lost. We quantify the information loss in terms of the speed of learning -the exponential rate at which the probability of choosing a suboptimal action vanishes -and identify two forces that lead to inefficiently slow learning.
The first force, which we call the coarseness effect, is directly due to the fact that discrete actions are only a coarse signal about beliefs. We study this force in an environment with two agents, where agent 1 observes the actions of agent 2, while agent 2 observes only her own private signals. Since actions are observed unidirectionally, the actions an agent takes do not influence the information she will receive in future periods. Hence, it is optimal for each agent to behave myopically -that is, to choose the action that maximizes her expected utility in each period.
We find that in the long-run agent 1, who can observe 2's actions, learns as quickly as she would learn if she would observe some fixed fraction of agent 2's private signals (but not her actions). For Normal signals, this fraction equals 9 /16 = 56.25%. That is, agent 1 learns equally quickly when she observes agent 2's actions (but not her signals) and when she sees 56.25% of agent 2's private signals (but not her actions). We calculate this fraction for arbitrary distributions of signals, and show that it ranges from zero to one, so that, depending on the distribution, it may be the case that almost all of the information is lost, or it may be that almost none is lost. Perhaps surprisingly, this fraction is independent of the agent's utility and set of actions. Especially, it does not depend on how finely one discretizes a continuous action space. Thus, the speed of learning in the continuous action model cannot be approximated using the speed of learning in discrete actions models, no matter how fine the discretization.
The second force, which we call the groupthink effect, emerges when agents observe each other bidirectionally. In this case an agent's actions depend on her higher order beliefs, and thus observing her actions may reveal less information about her private signals. We study this force in an environment where n ≥ 2 agents all observe each others' actions. For tractability, we assume that agents are myopic.
1
Groupthink occurs when a consensus on an action forms in the initial periods, making it optimal for an agent to continue taking the consensus action, even when her private information indicates otherwise. This is similar to the phenomenon of herding in models where the agents act sequentially. We show that typically, after a wrong consensus forms, all agents quickly observe private signals providing strong evidence for choosing the correct action, and yet a long time may pass until any of them breaks the wrong consensus. This leads to long periods of little information aggregation and a slow speed of learning.
2
With more agents, each individual agent is less likely to break a wrong consensus. On the other hand, the number of potential dissenters is larger, and so a priori it is not obvious whether groupthink becomes more or less likely. We show that the inefficiency (measured as the share of information that is lost) associated with the groupthink effect increases with the number of agents. Quantitatively, even as the number of agents goes to infinity, the speed of learning from actions stays bounded by a constant, whereas the speed of learning from the aggregated signals, which is proportional to the number of agents, goes to infinity. Thus, almost all information is lost; the agents' belief has the same precision as would result from observing a vanishingly small fraction of the available private signals. For example, for normal signals, a group of n agents observing each others' actions learns asymptotically slower than a group of 4 agents who share their private signals; this holds for any n! Hence, at most a fraction of 4 /n of the private information is transmitted through actions.
A natural alternative measure of the speed of learning is the expected discounted payoff loss, relative to a case where all private signals are public. This measure depends on the mistake probabilities in the early periods of the game, which, even for the single agent case, are in general intractable. As a consequence, previous work has studied asymptotic (long run) rates of learning (e.g., Vives, 1993; Chamley, 2004; Duffie and Manso, 2007; Duffie et al., 2009 Duffie et al., , 2010 Jadbabaie et al., 2013; Molavi et al., 2015) , and we do the same. In particular, Jadbabaie et al. (2013) and Molavi et al. (2015) study the rate of learning in an almost identical setting, with boundedly rational agents. Asymptotic rates have been studied in other settings in which it is difficult to analyze the short-term dynamics (e.g., Hong and Shum (2004) and Hörner and Takahashi (2016) ), and more generally asymptotic results are common in the field of learning (e.g., Kalai and Lehrer (1993) ).
Using asymptotic rates to quantify the speed of learning has the disadvantage that these rates, in general, convey no information about the initial time periods (and thus expected payoffs). The reason for this is that the rate of learning describes the probability of making a mistake only up to an error term which might be large in early periods, but vanishes in later periods. However, asymptotic rates are tractable, and -as we show -have the further advantage of being independent of many details of the model, providing a measure that is robust to changes in such model parameters as the agents' prior or the exact utility function.
Moreover, the approximation error made in early periods when considering asymptotic rates need not be large. In fact, in some natural examples, the asymptotic rates correspond closely to the short-term dynamics and provide the correct economic intuition. We highlight this by studying a canonical setting of a large group of agents with Normal private signals, where, as the size of the group is increased, the total precision of their signals is kept constant. In this case, our results on the learning rates show that the speed of learning tends to zero as the size of the group grows. By carefully analyzing the learning dynamics in this setting, we show that this result does not only hold in the long-run, but also in the initial periods, where the agents learn less and less, the larger the group gets. Specifically, after revealing some information by their action in the first period, the agents -with high probability for large groups -get locked into groupthink and ignore their subsequent private signals in many of the initial periods, choosing instead to follow the majority opinion of the first period.
Our paper is closely related to models of rational herding (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Banerjee, 1992; Smith and Sørensen, 2000; Chamley, 2004) , as we use the same conditional i.i.d. structure of signals, and utilities depend only on one's own actions and the state. The main difference is that in most herding models, each agent acts only once, whereas in our model, agents take actions repeatedly. An implication of this interaction is a feedback effect where an agent's action today influences other agents' future actions, which in turn change her own future actions. This entails an additional dimension relative to the herding literature: the complexity and importance of higher order beliefs. Agents' actions depend on beliefs of arbitrarily high order, since, unlike in the herding literature, is it not sufficient to reason about others' beliefs, but one must also reason about their beliefs regarding one's own beliefs and so on. A contribution of this paper is to provide an analysis of this interaction, circumventing the calculation of beliefs, which in such contexts is well known to be intractable (as discussed for example by Gale and Kariv (2003) 3 ). In our repeated action setting there may be a strategic incentive to change ones own action in order to gain more information from future actions of others. This effect does not exist for rational myopic agents, who do not value future information, and we assume myopic agents. The same choice is made in most of the learning literature (where signals are private and agents interact repeatedly) either explicitly (e.g., Sebenius and Geanakoplos, 1983; Parikh and Krasucki, 1990; Bala and Goyal, 1998; Keppo et al., 2008) , or implicitly, by assuming that there is a continuum of agents (e.g., Vives, 1993; Gale and Kariv, 2003; Duffie and Manso, 2007; Duffie et al., 2009 Duffie et al., , 2010 . A possible justification for this approach is that reasoning about the informational effect of one's actions in such setups requires a level of sophistication that seems unrealistic in many applications.
4
In the herding literature agents either learn or do not learn the state, depending on whether private signals have bounded likelihood ratios (Smith and Sørensen, 2000) . In our model, the distinction between unbounded and bounded private signals is not important, since the aggregate of each agent's private information suffices to learn the state. When agents fail to learn in the herding literature, it is because they disregard their private signals and follow the actions of their predecessors. Similar phenomena are described in other works (for example Vives, 1993; Bala and Goyal, 1998; Mossel et al., 2015) , and the same basic mechanism underlies our groupthink effect.
Potential applications of our results appear in settings in which agents repeatedly learn from each other. These include the dissemination of information in developing countries (e.g., Conley and Udry (2010); Banerjee et al. (2013) among many studies), the adoption of opinions on social networks, and prediction markets where forecasters observe the forecasts of others (see Da and Huang (2016) ). The main lesson we offer is that too much communication can slow down learning, through the groupthink effect. This lesson may be of interest to those who study these interactions, as well as to those who design them.
In this case the agent simply takes the action to which her posterior belief assigns higher probability:
2.5.2. Monopolistic Sellers. As an application, consider local monopolistic sellers who want to learn about the demand for their product and the associated optimal price. Each seller acts in a different market, so that there are no payoff externalities. The distribution of demand, however, is the same, so that the realized demand in other markets is informative about future demands in a seller's home market. For concreteness, assume that the sellers are shop owners who are selling a new product, and that in the high state the number of people entering the store to inquire about the product is Poisson with mean ρ h , while in the low state it is Poisson with mean ρ l , which is less than ρ h . After learning the price each customer decides whether or not to buy, depending on her private valuation. Customers' private valuations for the product are independent of the state, and so, after having entered the store, customers reveal no new information about the state. Thus, the information a seller learns about the state from her own customers is independent of the price she sets.
When marginal profits are not constant in the volume of sales, a seller will want to set one price if the state is high, another price if the state is low, and potentially intermediate prices when she is unsure about the state. Consequently, each seller wants to learn the state and does so not only by observing the demand in her store, but also by observing the prices set by other sellers.
Results
In this section we describe our results on the speed of learning under the different informational assumptions (autarky, unidirectional and bidirectional observation). Section 4 derives the learning dynamics in detail and explains how they lead to the results of this section.
Recall that we consider three information structures: i) a single agent acting in autarky, ii) two agents where one agent can observe the other's actions, but not vice versa, and iii) the case where n agents observe each others' actions bidirectionally.
In all three cases we derive results on the speed at which agents learn the state. More precisely, we consider the probability with which an agent i takes a suboptimal action in period t:
As the action is suboptimal (given knowledge of the state) we refer to this event as agent i "making a mistake", even though she takes the action which is optimal given her information.
3.1. Autarky. In the single agent case, this probability is well known to decay exponentially, with a rate r a that can be calculated explicitly in terms of the cumulant generating functions
and λ l (z) := − log E l e z :
10 Theorem 1. The probability that a single agent in autarky chooses the wrong action in period t satisfies
11
(1)
where
This type of autarky result is classical and can be found, for example, in studies of Bayesian hypothesis testing (see, e.g. Cover and Thomas (2012, pages 314-316) ). For us it serves as a benchmark for the case when agents try to learn from the actions of others.
3.2. Unidirectional Observation. When agent 1 can observe agent 2's actions, but not vice versa, we show that her probability of making a mistake decays exponentially as well, and calculate the rate in terms of the Fenchel conjugates 12 (also known as the convex conjugate
Theorem 2. The probability with which agent 1 makes a mistake when she observes all past actions of agent 2 unidirectionally satisfies
The rate r u depends only on the signal distributions µ l , µ h , and not on the utility u, the agents' prior, or the set of actions A. Of course, changing the set of actions can have a large impact on the short-term dynamics: a very rich set will reveal much information in the early periods, while not changing the asymptotic speed. The reason that a larger set of actions will not change the speed of learning is that in the long-run only the certainty actions convey information to agent 1 (see Proposition 12).
We find that the rate r u is always strictly larger than r a , so that agent 1 learns faster than she would have in autarky. Also, it is always strictly lower than 2 r a , which is the rate at which agent 1 would learn if she could observe all of agent 2's private signals.
10 Here is a random variable with a distribution that is equal to that of any of the log-likelihood ratios i t . The definition of the cumulant generating function differs by a sign from the usual one. 11 Here, and elsewhere, we write o(t) to mean a lower order term. Formally a function f : R → R is in o(t) if lim t→∞ f (t)/t = 0. 12 Our definition of the Fenchel conjugate differs by a sign from the usual one.
Likewise, if agent 2 were to take continuous actions that reveal her beliefs, then agent 1's speed of learning would be 2 r a . Thus observing discrete actions rather than continuous ones causes a drop in the speed of learning. This drop is independent of how many finite actions are available to agent 2, or what her exact utility function is: for any such choice the learning rate of agent 1 is the same r u < 2 r a . We thus call this the coarseness effect: a slowdown in learning that is the result of observing coarse actions rather than precise beliefs.
Agent 1 learns from agent 2's actions which state she believes to be more likely. However, agent 1 does not learn the exact strength of agent 2's belief. This information, about the certainty of agent 2, would have been useful to agent 1 as it would have allowed her to decide whether to follow her own private signal or agent 2's last period action in case the two disagree. This loss of information causes learning to be slower than it would have been if agent 1 were to observe 2's signals directly.
It is important to note that the rate r u with which agent 1 learns has a clear economic meaning also for intermediate values (r a , 2 r a ): If the rate equals r u then the speed at which the agent learns equals the speed at which she would learn, if she were to observe the fixed fraction This implies that agent 1 learns as fast as she would learn if she observed 9/16 ≈ 56% of agent 2's private signals, instead of her actions. Equivalently, 7/16 ≈ 44% of agent 2's private information is lost en route to agent 1, due to the coarseness effect.
An interesting class of signal structures is that of symmetric distributions µ l , µ h , such that the induced log likelihood ratio conditioned on Θ = h is identical to the distribution of − , conditioned on Θ = l. For example, normal private signals are symmetric, as are binary private signals. In this case we find that agent 1 asymptotically learns at least as quickly as she would learn if she were able to observe half of agent 2's signals directly Proposition 4. r u > 3 /2 r a whenever the signal distributions are symmetric.
We further discuss symmetric distributions in Section 4.5. In Section 4.6 we discuss other private signals such as Poisson, binary and trinary signals, and show that the calculation of these rates is often tractable. Numerically, we find that for trinary signals, r u can be arbitrarily close to 2 r a -the case in which almost no information is lost. For (asymmetric) Poisson signals, we find that r u can be arbitrarily close to r a , so that almost all information is lost. This shows that our results are sharp, in the sense that no further bounds on the speed of learning can be obtained without imposing additional restrictions on the distributions of signals.
3.3. Bidirectional Observation. Finally, we consider the case where n agents observe each others' actions. When n = 2, we compare the probability of mistake to the probability of mistake by agent 1 (the observer) in the unidirectional observation case. We find that this probability is exponentially higher:
Theorem 5. If agent 1 and agent 2 observe each other bidirectionally, there is an r 2 < r u such that
Thus, the fact that agent 2 can now also observe agent 1 hurts agent 1 in the long run, as compared to the setting in which agent 2 did not observe agent 1. It should be again emphasized that this statement does not imply anything about the probability of error in early periods; as a statement about exponential rates it claims that for large enough t, the probability of mistake by agent 1 in the bidirectional case will be exponentially larger than in the unidirectional case. Furthermore, agent 2 learns potentially at a faster rate in the bidirectional case as she might benefit from observing agent 1's actions.
Our second main result is that for any number of agents the speed of learning is bounded from above by a constant:
Theorem 6. Suppose n agents all observe each others' past actions. Given the private signal distributions, there exists a constantr b > 0 such that for any number of agents
Thus adding more agents (and with them more private signals and more information) cannot boost the speed of learning past some bound, and as n tends to infinity more and more of the information is lost. In the case of normal signalsr b = 4 r a , and thus, regardless of the number of agents, the probability of mistake is eventually higher than it would be if 4 agents shared their private signals. Thus for large groups most of the private signals are effectively lost.
To prove both of these theorems we calculate the asymptotic probability of the event that all agents choose the wrong certainty action in almost all time periods up to time t. We call this event groupthink and show that its probability is already high, which implies that the probability that one particular agent errs at time t is also high. Intuitively, when a wrong consensus forms by chance in the beginning, it is hard to break and can last for a long time, with surprisingly high probability. This is due to the fact that agents require their private signals to be relatively strong in order to choose a dissenting action.
In fact, conditioned on groupthink, it holds, with high probability, that the private signals of each agent, which initially indicated the wrong action, eventually indicate the correct action, but are still ignored due to the overwhelming information provided by the actions of others (Theorem 29). We thus find the term groupthink an apt description of the phenomenon.
Note again, that Theorem 6 is a statement about asymptotic rates. In fact, if one increases the number of agents while holding the private signal distributions fixed, the probability of the agents choosing correctly at any given period t > 1 approaches 1. Still, the rate is bounded, and so the probability of a mistake at later time periods is higher than what one might expect.
3.4. An Analysis of Early Period Mistake Probabilities. One could alternatively increase the number of agents while holding the total amount of information available to them constant. As an example, we consider n agents who each receive Normal private signals with fixed conditional means ±1 and variance n. If such signals were publicly observable they would be informationally equivalent to a single Normal signal with variance 1 each period.
Thus, as the total amount of information available is bounded, the probability of choosing correctly in the early periods does not tend to one as the number of agents increases. Furthermore, as each agent learns at most as much from seeing the other agents' actions as she would from seeing 3 other agents' signals (see Section 4.6.1), and the informativeness of private signals goes to zero as n → ∞, the speed of learning tends to zero.
Moreover, a detailed analysis in the case where agents want to match the state (Section 2.5.1) shows that already in the first periods, as the number of agents increases they learn less and less from each other's actions, and so the asymptotic result "kicks in" early on (in the second period):
Theorem 7. Suppose n agents have normal private signals with conditional distributions N (±1, n) and want to match the state, so thatū(θ, a) = 1 {a=θ} . Then, for every t, the probability that all agents in the periods {2, 3, . . . , t} choose the action that the majority of the agents chose in period 1 converges to one as n goes to infinity.
Thus the private signals of periods {2, . . . , t} are with high probability not used in these periods. Consequently, the actions in these periods are correct only if the action taken by the majority in the first period is correct. This probability is bounded by Φ(1) ∼ 0.84 for any n. Of course, this probability can be arbitrarily close to 1/2 if the private signal distributions has a larger variance. In this case, almost all information is lost even in early periods, if the number of agents is sufficiently high. In Figure 3 .1 we show how the probability that all agents take the wrong action in the second period increases when the number of agents increases. In the setting of Theorem 7, this figure charts the probability that all agents ignore their private signal in the second period, choosing instead to follow the choice of the majority in the first period, as a function of the number of agents. We plot even (blue line) and odd (orange line) numbers of agents in different colors to make the chart more readable.
Learning Dynamics
In this section we analyze the learning dynamics under the different informational assumptions, in detail. We explain how agents interpret each other's actions and how they choose their own. The analysis of these learning dynamics is related to questions in random walks and large deviations theory. Proving our results requires some mathematical innovation, the details of which we defer to the appendix. 4.1. Preliminaries. As an agent's objective is linear in her posterior belief p i t , the set of beliefs where she takes a given action is an interval. It will be convenient to define the agent's log-likelihood ratio (LLR)
As the LLR is a monotone transformation of the agent's posterior belief, and as a myopic agent's action is determined by her posterior, the same holds true in terms of LLRs. This can be summarized in the following claim.
Lemma 8. There exist disjoint intervals (L(α), L(α)) ⊂ R∪{−∞, +∞}, one for each action α ∈ A, such that, with probability one, a
To characterize the agent's actions it thus suffices to characterize her LLR. Note, that for the certainty action α l it holds that L(α l ) = −∞, and that analogously L(α h ) = +∞.
4.2. Autarky. As a benchmark, we first describe the autarky setting where a single agent acts by himself. In this section we omit the superscript signifying the agent.
Evolution of Beliefs. In autarky, the posterior probability the agent assigns to the high state before taking an action in period t is P t = P [θ = h | s 1 , . . . , s t ]. Applying Bayes' rule yields that the LLR L t follows a random walk with increments t = log dµ h dµ l (s t ) equal to the LLR of the signals the agent observed:
τ .
Probability of Mistakes. As a consequence of Lemma 8, the probability that the agent chooses the wrong action in period t when the state equals θ is given by
Hence, to calculate the probability of a mistake one needs to calculate the probability that the LLR is in a given interval. By (2) the LLR is the sum of increments which are i.i.d. conditional on the state, and hence (L t ) t is a random walk.
The short-run probability that a random walk is within a given interval is hard to calculate and depends very finely on the distribution of its increments.
13 As this makes it impossibleeven in the single agent case -to obtain any general results on the probability that the agent makes a mistake, we focus on the long-run probability of mistakes, which can be analyzed for general signal structures. The long-run behavior of random walks has been studied in large deviations theory, with one of the earliest result due to Cramér (1944) , who studied these questions in the context of calculating premiums for insurers. We will use some of the ideas and tools from this theory in our analysis; a self-contained introduction is given in Appendix A.
Beliefs. We define the private LLR R t as the LLR calculated only based on an agent's private signals:
In the single agent case the private signals are all the available information, so L t = R t , but this will no longer be the case once we consider more agents. Regardless of the number of agents and the information available to them, the private LLR is a random walk with steps generating function of the increments of the LLR in state θ by
and denote its Fenchel conjugate by
The following lemma (proven in the appendix) derives properties of λ θ , λ θ which follow from the fact that t is the LLR of the signal in period t.
The private log likelihood ratio R t concentrates around its conditional expectations, which are E l [ ] · t in the low state, and E h [ ] · t in the high state. The asymptotic probability that the private LLR lies anywhere in between these two extremes is given by the next lemma.
The proof of Lemma 10 in the Appendix uses the properties of λ θ and λ θ established in Lemma 9 to verify that the increments of the LLR process in both states are such that large deviation theory results are applicable. Lemma 10 allows us to calculate the probability of a mistake conditional on each state, immediately implying the next theorem, from which Theorem 1 follows immediately.
Theorem 11. The probability that an agent in autarky chooses the wrong action in period t satisfies
This result is classical and can be found, for example, in studies of Bayesian hypothesis testing (see, e.g. Cover and Thomas (2012, pages 314-316) ). We introduce it to familiarize the reader with the notation and tools that we will use in the sequel. We also note that it is possible to strengthen the results by replacing the lower order o(t) term by O(log(t)) using the Bahadur-Rao exact asymptotics method (see Dembo and Zeitouni (1998, Pages 110-113 ) for a detailed derivation). However, such precision will provide little additional economic insight while significantly complicating the proofs, and thus we will not pursue it.
Note, that the long-run probability of a mistake does not depend on the cut-offs
and L(α h ) and is hence independent of set of actions A and the utility function u. It is also independent of the prior. Thus quantifying the speed of learning using the exponential rate has both advantages and disadvantages: the rate is independent of many details of the model and depends only on the private signal distributions. It is also tractable and can be explicitly calculated for many distributions (see Section 4.6). As agent 2 acts in autarky, she behaves as described in Section 4.2. For example, in the "matching the state" setting (Section 2.5.1), the agents' actions will be given by
(as in autarky) and
Only the Last Action Unidirectionally. To get an intuition let us first assume that agent 1 observes only agent 2's last action a 2 t−1 . More precisely, we analyze the probability with which agent 1 will take a wrong action in period t after observing her first t private signals and the action of agent 2 at time t − 1. We study this setup to explain the inference problem of agent 1 and later, in Section 4.3, extend the analysis to the case where agent 1 sees all of agent 2's previous actions.
Bayes rule yields that the LLR of agent 1 when agent 2 takes the action α is given by
where I t (a 2 t−1 ) is the amount by which agent 1's log-likelihood is shifted when she observes agent 2 take action a 2 t−1 in period t − 1:
As the signals of agent 1 and agent 2 are independent, R 1 t is a random walk conditional on the state. The next proposition shows that there are three different types of inference I t (α) agent 1 can draw from agent 2's behavior.
Proposition 12. The function I t (a) satisfies
When agent 2 takes a certainty action α ∈ {α l , α h } agent 1 believes that agent 2 has strong evidence for the state in which agent 2's action is optimal. If agent 2 does not take a certainty action α / ∈ {α l , α h } agent 1 believes that agent 2 must have gotten a sequence of very uninformative signals as she knows that agent 2's belief is bounded away from certainty. As a consequence the influence that agent 2's action has on agent 1's LLR I t (α) vanishes for large t in this case. The fact, that the amount by which a full certainty action of agent 2 shifts agent 1's belief is asymptotically linear in the period t, with slope equal to the rate r a , follows as, by Theorem 11, the probability of a mistake in autarky vanishes at the rate r a :
Intuitively, as agent 1 knows that agent 2, who acts in autarky, will take a suboptimal action approximately with probability e −ra·t , agent 1 shifts her LLR by approximately −r a · t when she sees that agent 2 chose α l , and shifts by +r a · t when she sees agent 2 chose α h .
When agent 1 sees agent 2 take an action that is not optimal in either state she concludes that agent 2 is uninformed and ignores her action. 
where the second equality follows from Proposition 12. As shown in Lemma 8 agent 1 makes a mistake in the high state (i.e., does not choose α h ) whenever her likelihood is below L(a h ).
Thus, when a 2 t−1 = α l , agent 1 does not choose α h whenever R 1 t ≤ r a ·t+o(t). We can estimate the probability of this event using Lemma 10: it is e −λ h (ra)·t+o(t) . A similar calculation for the other two cases yields
To calculate the overall probability of a mistake in state h we calculate the probability with which the three above cases occur in Appendix C. We illustrate this type of calculation here by solving the simplest case where agent 1 chooses a wrong action and agent 2 chooses the correct action α h . By Theorem 11 the probability that agent 2 chooses the correct action
As a consequence the probability that agent 1 chooses a wrong action and agent 2 chooses the correct action equals
The analysis of the other two cases in Appendix C uses similar arguments and leads to the following result:
Proposition 13. The probability that agent 1 makes a mistake if she observes agent 2's last action unidirectionally satisfies
where r u := r a + min {λ h (r a ), λ l (r a )} = min {λ l (−r a ), λ h (−r a )}.
Observing All Past Actions Unidirectionally. We have so far determined the rate at which agent 1 makes a mistake when she can observe only the last action of agent 2. As agent 1 can always ignore additional information, it follows that her speed of learning is (weakly) greater when she can observe all past actions of agent 2. Thus the question is whether agent 1 can learn useful information from agent 2's earlier actions, and whether the rate at which agent 1 learns if she observes all of agent 2's actions is strictly higher than the rate at which she learns when she can only observe agent 2's last action. Agent 2's last period action reveals which state she considers more likely. Hence, her previous actions will only help to assess how much more likely agent 2 considers that state. This information is helpful for agent 1 as it allows her to ignore agent 2's action whenever she believes her evidence to be relatively weak, which is the case when agent 2 switched her action recently. As a consequence, agent 1 is strictly less likely to make a mistake whenever all actions of agent 2 are public information.
Our next result shows, however, that in the long-run this effect is vanishingly small, and agent 1 does not significantly benefit from this information: the rate at which she learns exactly equals the rate when she can only observe the last action of agent 2.
Theorem 14. The probability with which agent 1 makes a mistake when she observes all past actions of agent 2 unidirectionally satisfies
Here r u = r a + min {λ h (r a ), λ l (r a )} = min {λ l (−r a ), λ h (−r a )} is the same rate that is defined in Proposition 13, and thus this theorem is a restatement of Theorem 2.
The proof of Theorem 14 argues that it is, in the long-run, approximately equally likely that agent 2 takes the wrong certainty action in the last period and that agent 2 takes the wrong certainty action in all periods. As we explain in the appendix, this result follows from the same logic as Bertrand's classical Ballot Theorem (Bertrand (1887)), which states that the probability that a random walk deviates significantly from its expectation at time t is comparable to the probability that it deviates at all periods prior to time t. Specifically, the ratio between these probabilities scales like 1/t, and therefore, having a sub-exponential dependence on t, does not affect the exponential rate.
To understand how fast agent 1 learns in this setting, we first note that min {λ h (r a ), λ l (r a )} > 0, and so r u > r a (see Claim 24). Thus the rate of learning when observing agent 1 is strictly higher than when learning in autarky. Second, r u < 2r a (Claim 25), so that the speed of learning is strictly less than it would be if agent 1 had access to all of agent 2's private signals.
An illustrative example is that of Normal signals, where s i t ∼ N(m θ , σ 2 ) for some m l = m h and σ > 0. We calculate in Section (4.6.1) that in this case
where ρ = (m h − m l ) 2 /(2σ 2 ). Thus r a = ρ/4, and, as one would expect, the rate of learning in autarky is higher the more separated the private signal distribution. More interestingly, it follows that r u = 25 16 r a , for any value of σ 2 .
Bidirectional Observation and the Groupthink Effect.
In this section we consider n ≥ 2 agents. Each agent observes a sequence of private signals s i 1 , . . . , s i t , and the action taken by other agents in previous periods (a j τ ) τ <t,j =i . In this setting we prove Theorems 5 and 6. As before, we consider myopic agents who completely discount future payoffs, and thus at each period choose the action that maximizes their expected payoffs at that period. For example, in the "matching the state" setting (Section 2.5.1), the agents' actions will be given by
The Probability that All Agents Make a Mistake in Every Period. Let G t be the event that all agents choose the action α l in all time periods up to t:
To simplify the exposition we assume in the main text that G t has strictly positive probability.
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Conditioned on Θ = h, the event G t is the event that all the agents are, and always have been, in unanimous agreement on the wrong action α l . We thus call G t the groupthink event. The probability of G t provides a lower bound on the probability that an agent makes a mistake in period t, conditioned on Θ = h. This event can be written as
t is the event that agent i chooses the wrong action α l in every period τ ≤ t. To calculate the probability of G t , it would of course have been convenient if these n events were independent, conditioned on Θ. However, due to the fact that the agents' actions are strongly intertwined, these events are not independent; given that agent 1 played α l in all time periods, agent 2 is more likely to do the same. This poses a difficulty in the analysis of this model that is a direct consequence of the fact that the agents' actions are intricately dependent on their higher order beliefs.
Decomposition in Independent Events. Perhaps surprisingly, it turns out that G t can neverthe-less be written as the intersection of conditionally independent events. We now describe how this can be done.
Lemma 15. There exists a threshold (q τ ) τ such that the event G t equals the event that no agent's private LLR R i hits the threshold q before period t
The proof of Lemma 15 in Appendix E shows this result recursively. Intuitively, whenever G t−1 occurs, all agents take action α l up to time t − 1. Hence, conditional on G t−1 , whether agent i takes the action α l at time t depends only on R i t . As α l is the most extreme action it follows that the set of private LLRs where the agent takes the action α l must be a halfinfinite interval and is thus characterized by a threshold q. By symmetry, this is the same threshold for all agents.
Calculating the Thresholds. To calculate the q t 's we consider agent j's decision problem at time t, conditioned on G t−1 . The information available to her is her own private signals (and in particular her private log-likelihood ratio R j t , which is a sufficient statistic for Θ), and in addition the fact that all other agents have chosen α l up to this point. But the latter observation is equivalent to knowing that all the other agent's private log-likelihood ratios have been under the thresholds q in all previous time periods! Formally, knowing G t−1 is equivalent to knowing that
has occurred for all 1 < i ≤ n. This leads to the following recursive characterization of the threshold q.
Proposition 16. The threshold q t is characterized by the recursive relation
Having established this additional connection between the events W i t and the thresholds (q τ ) τ , we next explain that q t is asymptotically linear with some slope q, so that
and estimate the probability of the event W i t in terms of q.
We show in the appendix (Claim 27) that P l W i t−1 is essentially a constant. It follows that if we take the limits of (9) divided by t, the contribution of the denominator on the right hand side vanishes, and we arrive at
Note, that it remains to be explained why this limit exists, which indeed we do, in Appendix E. Thus, if we denote the left hand side of the above display by q = lim t→∞ q t /t, then
t , and since these W i t 's are conditionally independent, we have that
We thus turn to calculating q. To this end we show in the appendix (Theorem 23) that the probability of the event W i t , which is the event that the private LLR R i τ is below the threshold q τ for all τ ≤ t, is comparable to the probability of the subevent {R i t ≤ q t } that the private LLR is below the threshold just at the last time period t. In particular, both have the same rate, conditioned on Θ = h. The large deviations estimate (Lemma 10) implies that
and so, since W i t has the same rate as {R i t ≤ q t },
as well. Thus it follows from (11) that q, the asymptotic slope of the thresholds (q t ), is the solution to the fixed point equation
Note that q depends only on the private signal distributions, through λ h . Since λ h is nonnegative and decreasing, this equation will always have a unique solution. For example, when n = 2 and private signals are normal, we get that q = 4
r a ≈ 0.69r a . Having calculated q, we now also know from (12) the rate r g = n n − 1 q of the event G t that all agents take the wrong action in all periods up to time t. This provides a bound on the speed of learning in this setting, conditioned on Θ = h. A simple convexity argument now yields the following claim.
Claim 17. For any number of agents n it holds that r g < E h [ ].
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Noting, that
and repeating this calculation when conditioning on the low state, we have proved Theorem 6,
In the case of Normal private signals,r b = 4r a . In the case of n = 2 agents, we get that q is given by the fixed point equation q = λ h (q), and that
In the normal signal case this rate is about 1.37r a , and is in particular less than r u = 25 16 r a ≈ 1.56r a . The following claim states that this is true in general:
This completes the proof of Theorem 5 and the analysis of the case of bidirectional observations. The next section will consider the special case of symmetric private signal distributions, in which more can be said about the speeds of learning.
Symmetric Private Signal Distributions.
Many natural examples of private signal distribution are, in a sense, invariant to renaming the states. Formally, we say that the private signal distributions are symmetric if the distribution of the induced log likelihood ratio conditioned on Θ = h is identical to the distribution of − , conditioned on Θ = l. This, for example, is the case for Normal private signals where µ θ = N (m θ , σ 2 ). For symmetric signals we can make a few additional observations. First, we note that symmetry implies that λ h = λ l and likewise λ h = λ * l . We thus, in this section, omit the subscripts. Since in general λ h (z) = λ l (1 − z), we have that in this symmetric case λ(z) = λ(1 − z), or that λ is symmetric to reflection around z = 1/2.
Recall that r a , the rate of learning in autarky, is equal to λ (0) = max z≥0 λ(0). Since λ(z) = λ(1 − z), and since λ is concave, this maximum is attained at z = 1/2, and so we have that r a = λ(1/2). It thus follows from (16) that
This is also known as the Bhattacharyya distance (Bhattacharyya (1943) ) between the two distributions, and is a commonly used measure of the distance between distributions.
Recall that r u = λ * (−r a ) = max z≥0 λ(z) + r a z. Substituting z = 1/2 yields
Since the maximum is not attained at z = 1/2 (since λ (1/2) = 0 = r a ), we have strict inequality, and so r u > on the speed of learning in the unidirectional case, or, equivalently, an upper bound on how much can be lost due to the coarseness effect. We state this formally in the following claim.
Proposition 19. When private signals are symmetric then r u > 3 2 r a .
The example of asymmetric Poisson private signals that we consider in the next section shows that this it not true in general, and that r u can be arbitrarily close to r a for asymmetric signals.
4.6. The Speed of Learning for Different Signal Distributions. In this section we calculate the speeds of learning for some examples of private signal distributions. Our goal is to show that these calculations are often tractable, and to discuss the range of possible values of r a and r u , in particular showing that without further restrictions on the signal distributions one cannot obtain results restricting r u /r a beyond (1, 2) for general distributions and ( 3 /2, 2) for symmetric distributions.
4.6.1. Normal Private Signals. The simplest example is that of Normal private signals, where the distribution of private signals is either
, then an easy calculation shows that
for η ≤ ρ and λ h (η) = 0 for η ≥ ρ. Substituting the results of Theorems 11 and 14, we have that r a = ρ/4 and r u = 25 16 r a . Thus, in the Normal case, learning with unidirectional observations is always faster by a factor of 25/16 than learning on ones own, regardless of the means and variance of the signals.
When there are n agents observing bidirectionally, it is easy to calculate, using (13), that the rate of the groupthink event G t in which all agents take a wrong action in all time periods up to time t is
In particular, when there are only two agents, r g = 8
r a ≈ 1.37 r a , which is less than r u , as guaranteed by Claim (18).
For n agents, the upper bound on the speed of learning,r b , is, in this case, equal to ρ, which is equal to 4 · r a , so that learning from actions in a group of any size is slower than learning directly from the private signals of 4 agents. 4.6.2. Poisson Private Signals. When private signals are Poisson with mean either ρ l or ρ h then the expressions for λ h , λ h , r a and r u are rather complex. However, they can still be calculated analytically, for example by using Mathematica. Mathematica's symbolic engine can also be used to formally show that for fixed ρ l , as one takes larger and larger ρ h , the ratio r u /r a tends to one. Thus, in the case of very different means of the two distributions, learning in the unidirectional case can be negligibly faster than learning on ones own. If we fix ρ l but this time let ρ h tend to ρ l , then r u /r a tends to 25/16, as in the Normal case.
4.6.3. Binary Private Signals. A commonly used example of private signals is that of symmetric binary signals s i t ∈ {l, h} which are equal to the state with constant probability 4.6.4. Trinary Private Signals. Another interesting class of private signal distributions are those that are supported on three values, which we take to be {−1, 0, 1}. We assume 0 to be uninformative, and thus occurring with the same probability ξ in either state. Intuitively, 1 − ξ corresponds to the probability of getting an informative signal. Conditional on getting an informative signal, we assume the signal to equal +1 with probability p in the high state, and −1 with probability p in the low state. This signal distribution is symmetric, and thus by Proposition 19 we have that r u /r a > 3 /2. Numerical calculations suggest that for any 0 < ξ < 1, as p tends to 1, the ratio r u /r a tends to 2. Thus, in this case, the speed of learning from actions is close to the speed of learning from signals, and hence almost no information is lost.
In this case
λ h (z) = − log φ φ 1 − φ −z + (1 − φ) φ 1 − φ z .
If we denote by
D KL (p||q) = p log p q + (1 − p) log 1 − p 1 − q the
Conclusion
We introduce asymptotic rates as a measure of the speed of learning in models of repeated interaction. While asymptotic rates have no formal implications for short run dynamics, they do provide intuition for the forces at work.
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This article leaves many open questions which could potentially be analyzed using our approach. What happens when the state changes over time? What happens with payoff externalities, for example when agents have a motive to coordinate? Of particular interest is the study of a more complex societal structure of the agents: how fast do they learn for a given network of observation, which is not the complete network? Large Deviations of Random Walks. The long-run behavior of random walks has been studied in large deviations theory. We now introduce some tools from this literature, which will be crucial to understanding the long-run behavior of agents. Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . be i.i.d random variables with E [X t ] = µ and Y t = t τ =1 X t the associated random walk with steps X t . By the law of large numbers we know that Y t should approximately equal µ·t. Large deviation theory characterizes the probability that Y t is much lower, and in particular smaller than η · t, for some η < µ. Under some technical conditions, this probability is exponentially small, with a rate λ (η):
or equivalently stated
The rate λ can be calculated explicitly and is the Fenchel Conjugate of the cumulant generating function of the increments
The first proof of a "large deviation" result of this flavor is due to Cramér (1944) , who studied these questions in the context of calculating premiums for insurers. A standard textbook on large deviations theory is Dembo and Zeitouni (1998) . In this section we provide an independent proof of this classical large deviations result, and prove a more specialized one suited to our needs. We consider a very general setting: we make no assumptions on the distribution of each step X t , and in particular do not need to assume that it has an expectation.
Denoting X = X 1 , The cumulant generating function λ is (up to sign, as compared to the usual definition) given by
Note that when the right hand side is not finite it can only equal −∞ (and never +∞).
Proposition 20. λ is finite on an interval I, on which it is concave and on whose interior it is smooth (that is, having continuous derivatives of all orders).
Proof. Note that I contains 0, since λ(0) = 0 by definition. Assume λ(a) and λ(b) are both finite. Then for any r ∈ (0, 1)
which by Hölder's inequality is at least r · λ(a) + (1 − r) · λ(b). Hence λ is finite and concave on a convex subset of R, or an interval. We omit here the technical proof of smoothness; it can be found, for example, in Stroock (2013, Theorem 1.4.16) .
It also follows that unless the distribution of X is a point mass (which is a trivial case), λ is strictly concave on I. We assume this henceforth. Note that it could be that I is simply the singleton [0, 0] . This is not an interesting case, and we will show later that in our setting I is larger than that.
The Fenchel conjugate of λ is given by
We note a few properties of λ . First, since λ(0) = 0 and λ(z) < ∞, λ is well defined and non-negative (but perhaps equal to infinity for some η). Second, since λ is equal to −∞ whenever it is not finite, the supremum is attained on I, unless it is infinity. Third, since λ is strictly concave on I, λ(z) − η · z is also concave there, and so the supremum is a maximum and is attained at a single point z ∈ I whenever it is finite. Additionally, since λ is smooth on I, this single point z satisfies λ (z) = η if z > 0 (equivalently, if λ (η) > 0).
I.e., if λ (z) = η for some z in the interior of I then
Finally, it is immediate from the definition that λ * is weakly decreasing, and it is likewise easy to see that it is continuous. This, together with (14) and the fact that λ is decreasing, yields that λ (η) = λ(0) = 0 whenever η ≥ sup z≥0 λ (z). We summarize this in the following claim.
Proposition 21. Let I be the interval on which λ is finite, and let I = {η : ∃z ∈ intI s.t. λ (z) = η}. Then
(1) λ * is continuous, non-negative and weakly decreasing. It is positive and strictly decreasing on I * .
(2) λ (η) = 0 whenever η ≥ sup z≥0 λ (z).
Given all this, we are ready to state and prove our first large deviations theorem.
Theorem 22. For every η such that η > inf z∈I λ (z) it holds that
Proof. For the upper bound, we use a Chernoff bound strategy: for any z ≥ 0
and so by Markov's inequality
e −z·(η·t+o(t)) . Now, note that E e −z Yt = e −λ(z)·t , and so
Choosing z ≥ 0 to maximize the coefficient of t yields
which is the desired lower bound. We now turn to proving the upper bound. Denote by ν the law of X, and for some fixed z in the interior of I (to be determined later) define the probability measureν by
= e λ(z)−zx , and letX t be i.i.d. random variables with lawν. Note that
Now, fix any η 1 , η 2 such that η 1 < η 2 < η and λ (z) = η 2 for some z in the interior of I; this is possible since η > inf z∈I λ (z). This is the z we choose to take in the definition ofν. If we think of η 2 as being close to η then the expectation ofX, which is equal to η 2 , is close to η. We have thus "tilted" the random variable X, which had expectation µ, to a new random variable with expectation close to η. We can bound
where ν (t) is the t-fold convolution of ν with itself, and hence the law of Y t . It is easy to verify 17 that dν (t) (y) =e zy−λ(z)·t dν (t) (y), and so = e −λ(z)·t
which we can bound by taking the integrand out of the integral and replacing y with the lower integration limit:
Since the law ofỸ t = t τ =1X t isν (t) , this is equal to
Since η 1 < E X < η we have that lim t P η 1 · t ≤Ỹ t ≤ η · t + o(t) = 1, by the law of large numbers. Hence lim inf
which, by (14), and recalling that z = (λ ) −1 (η 2 ), can be written as lim inf
Taking the limit as η 1 approaches η 2 yields (15) lim inf
We now consider two cases. First, assume that η ≤ sup z≥0 λ (z). In this case we can choose η 2 arbitrarily close to η, and by the continuity of λ * we get that lim inf
or equivalently
The second case is that η > sup z≥0 λ (z). In this case λ (η) = 0 (Proposition 21). Also, (15) holds for any η 2 < sup z λ (z) and thus it holds for η 2 = sup z≥0 λ (z). But then λ (η 2 ) = 0 = λ (η), and so we again arrive at the same conclusion.
The next Theorem is similar in spirit, and in some sense is stronger than the previous, as it shows that the same rate applies to the event that the sum is below the threshold at all time periods prior to t, rather than just at period t. It furthermore does not require the threshold to be linear, but only asymptotically and from one direction; both of these generalizations are important. This theorem will be useful in analyzing both the unidirectional setting and the bidirectional setting. Theorem 23 is not an established result, but rather a (modest) contribution of this paper.
Theorem 23. For every η such that η > inf z∈I λ (z), and every sequence {y t } t∈N with lim inf t y t /t = η and P [Y t ≤ y t ] > 0 it holds that
Proof. Let E t be the event ∩ t τ =1 {Y τ ≤ y τ }. Let {t k } be a sequence such that lim k y t k /t k = η. For every t let t be the largest t k with t k ≤ t. Then by inclusion we have that
Using the same Chernoff bound strategy of the proof of Theorem 22, we get that
The continuity of λ implies that taking the limit superior of both sides yields lim sup
To show the other direction, define (as in the proof of Theorem 22)X t to be be i.i.d. random variables with lawν given by dν dν (x) = e λ(z)−zx , where ν is the law of X, and z ∈ I is chosen so that λ (z) = η 2 for some η 1 < η 2 < η. Denoting = η − η 1 , it follows from inclusion that
Now, the Radon-Nikodym derivative between the laws of (X 1 , . . . , X t ) and X 1 , . . . ,X t is e z(x 1 +···+xt)−λ(z)·t . Hence
Ỹ τ ≤ y τ . We can bound this expression by taking e zỸt−λ(z)·t out of the integral and replacing it with the lower bound y t − · t. This yields
Now, since the expectation ofỸ t /t is strictly between η = lim inf t y t /t and η − , we have that lim t P Ỹ t ≥ y t − · t = 1 by the weak law of large numbers. By the strong law of large numbers and the Markov Property of Ỹ t we have that lim t P Ẽ t > 0; Ỹ t is indeed Markov since X t are i.i.d. Thus lim t P Ẽ t ∩ Ỹ t ≥ y t − · t > 0 and
Proceeding as in the proof of Theorem 22 yields that
where the second equality is an application of (8). To estimate P h a 2 t−1 = α l we note that the event a 2 t−1 = α l is equal to the event
. Therefore, by Lemma 10, ra·t+o(t) . Hence
We are thus left with the estimation of the last addend, P h a 1 t = α h and a 2 t−1 ∈ α h , α l . To this end we note that
where the last equality is another consequence of Lemma 10. Therefore, by (8),
We thus have that
Recall that λ l (η) = λ h (−η) − η (by (17)) and so λ h (r a ) + r a = λ l (−r a ). Hence
We show in Claim 25 below that λ h (−r a ) < 2r a , and likewise λ l (−r a ) < 2r a . Given this, the last addend can be absorbed into the o(t) term, and we have that
where r u = min {λ h (−r a ), λ * l (−r a )} = r a + min {λ l (r a ), λ h (r a )} . By symmetry the same holds conditioned on Θ = l, and so we have shown that
Claim 25. λ h (−r a ) < 2r a and λ l (−r a ) < 2r a .
Proof. We show the former; the proof of the latter is identical. To this end, we first note that −r a > λ h (1) (Claim 24). It thus follows that the maximum in
is also obtained in (0, 1), since the z in which it is obtained is the solution to λ (z) = −r a . Thus λ h (−r a ) = max
This also concludes the proof of Proposition 13.
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Appendix D. Observing all Actions Unidirectionally
In this section we show that when agent 1 observes all of agent 2's actions, then the speed of learning is identical to the speed in the case that she observes only the last action:
One direction is immediate: observing all actions can only reduce the probability of error relative to observing the last action, and so we know that
It thus remains to be shown that
To show this we show that the probability of a smaller event already satisfies this inequality. Specifically, we condition (without loss of generality) on Θ = h and would like to consider the case that agent 2 chooses the wrong action α l at all time periods up to time t. A technical difficultly arises from the fact that for some priors and signal distributions it may be that agent 2 never chooses α l up to some period s, since the prior is too high and each signal is too weak. But of course there is some s such that P a
we define for each t the action α min τ to lowest (i.e., having the lowest L) that is taken by agent 2 with positive probability at time t. By the above, α min τ is equal to α l for all t large enough. We then prove the claim by showing that
That is, we show that even when agent 1 observes agent 2 take the wrong action at every period in which this is possible -even then agent 1 gets it wrong with probability that is comparable to the probability of mistake when observing only the last action. Denote by E t the event
We first claim that
−ra·t+o (t) and that (20)
so that asymptotically this event has the same rate as the event a 2 t = α l , for both possible values of Θ. Given this, the analysis is identical to the one carried out in Sec. 4.3, and likewise yields (18). It thus remains to calculate the conditional rates of E t , and in particular to show 36 that they are the same at the rates of the event a 2 t = α l . The key insight from which this follows is the classical Ballot Theorem (Bertrand (1887) 
and so in particular the event that Y t ≤ 0 has the same rate as the event that Y τ ≤ 0 for all τ ≤ t. Instead of using the Ballot Theorem, we use our Theorem 23.
Indeed, noting that the event E t can be written as
Thus, if we define X t = t and y t = L(α min τ ) − L 0 then lim t y t /t = 0 and Theorem 23 yields the desired rates. This completes the proof that when agent 1 observes all the actions of agent 2 then P a 2 t = α θ = e −ru·t+o(t) .
Therefore, by induction, and if we denote q 1 = L(α min τ ), we have that
Now, note that the event that agent i chooses α min τ in all periods is not independent of the event that some other agent j does the same. Still, by rearranging the above equation we can write G t as an intersection of conditionally independent events: 
Since the W i t−1 's are conditionally independent, we have that
Finally, by symmetry, all the numbers in the sum are equal, and
. Now, the last addend is just a number. Therefore, if we denote
and L 1 t ≤ L(α l ) (and thus a 1 t = α l ) whenever P 1 t ≤ q t .
We recall the recursive relation between q t and W Proof. Let F h and F l be the cumulative distribution functions of a private log-likelihood ratio , conditioned on Θ = h and Θ = l, respectively. Then it is easy to see that F h stochastically dominates F l , in the sense that F l (x) ≥ F h (x) for all x ∈ R. It follows that the joint distribution of {R i τ } τ ≤t conditioned on Θ = h dominates the same distribution conditioned on Θ = l, and so P h [W To prove the above, note that agents eventually learn Θ, since the private signals are informative. Therefore, conditioned on Θ = l, the limit of R i t as t tends to infinity must be −∞. Thus, with probability 1, for all t large enough it does hold that R exists, and q = (N − 1)λ h (q) .
Proof of Claim 17. Recall that λ h is strictly convex, and that λ h (D) = 0, where we denote
Substituting (n − 1)λ h (q) for q and simplifying yields
Since λ h (0) < D (Claim 24) we have shown that
and so n n − 1 q = nλ h (q) < D .
Proof of Claim 18. Since r u = min {λ l (−r a ), λ h (−r a )}, in order to prove the claim we need to show that 2 · q < λ h (−r a ); the corresponding condition for the low state will follow by the same argument. We consider two cases. If q ≥ r a then λ h (q) ≥ λ h (0), since q = λ h (q) and r a = λ h (0). By the monotonicity of λ h (Proposition 21) it then follows that q ≤ 0. But this is false (e.g., since it implies that q = λ h (q) ≥ λ h (0) > 0), and so we have reached a contradiction.
Hence q < r a , in which case λ h (−q) < λ h (−r a ), since λ h is strictly decreasing (Proposition 21). Now, since q = λ h (q), we have that 2 · q = q + λ h (q) = λ * l (−q), where the last equality follows from the general fact (see Appendix B) that λ l (η) = λ h (−η) − η. Thus 2 · q < λ h (−r a ).
We now turn to showing that conditioned on groupthink -that is, conditioned on the event G t -all agents have, with high probability, a private LLR R i t that indicates the correct action. In fact, the LLR is arbitrarily close to t · q, the asymptotic threshold for R i t above which groupthink ends.
Theorem 29. For every > 0 it holds that lim t→∞ P h R i t > t · (q − ) for all i | G t = 1, where, as above, q is the solution to q = (n − 1)λ h (q).
Proof. By Theorem 22 we know that lim t→∞ − 1 t log P h R
